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Foreword 
 
The Human System Integration (HSI) tasks that were performed in FY04 contributed to 
the development of functional requirements and design guidelines for High Altitude Long 
Endurance (HALE) Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA) operation at or above FL400 in 
the National Airspace (NAS). The Access 5 intent is to provide file and fly access to the 
NAS for HALE ROAs, identically to that available to manned aircraft.   
 
The HSI FY04 work package prepared the following deliverables to contribute to the 
Step 1 program objectives: 
 
• HSI Concepts Requirements and Definition Report, dated September 2004 
 
The Access 5 Systems Engineering Integration Team (SEIT) reviewed the above 
document and requested that it be divided into four component reports in order that 
content be more readily assimilated by users of the material. These component parts 
are: 
o HSI Regulatory Analysis, dated February 2005 
o HSI ROA Comparisons, dated February 2005 
o HSI Functional Decomposition, dated February 2005 
o HSI Top Level Requirements, dated February 2005 
 
 
The Concept Requirements and Definition Report was written in an integrated 
fashion and as a result breaking the material into stand-alone parts could not always 
be done with clear distinctions. The reader is encouraged to consult the integrated 
document if additional clarifications are needed. 
 
Other FY04 deliverables for the HSI Work Package were: 
 
• HSI ROA Guidelines Outline (Annex A) 
• HSI Functional Requirements- ROA C3 and CCA Subsystems  (Annex B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 The following document was prepared by a collaborative team through the noted work package. This 
was a funded effort under the Access 5 Project. 
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This deliverable is intended as an input to the Policy IPT. It aimed to answer the 
following question: 
 
Based on regulatory analyses of the FARS (specifically Part 91), the Airman’s 
Information Manual (AIM) and the FAA Controllers Handbook (7110.65) what are the 
requirements for ROA operation in the National Airspace System above FL400? 
 
 
 
 
Through a review of aviation reference material, including Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FAR), Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), FAA Order 7110.65, and Eurocontrol 
documents, eighty-four functions were derived that are necessary or highly desirable for 
flight within the ATM system. They include categories for Flight, Communications, 
Navigation, Surveillance, and Hazard Avoidance.  
 The following document was prepared by a collaborative team through the noted work package. This 
was a funded effort under the Access 5 Project. 
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1 Overall Problem: Unrestricted ROA Flight in the ATM System 
 
ROA operations and, hence, sales are not meeting their full potential because of ATM-
induced penalties. Currently, each ROA flight is handled as a special case, which is time-
consuming, complex, and expensive. ROA operators are unable to operate efficiently due 
to ATM-mandated restrictions. As a result, potential ROA buyers and operators are 
reluctant to make large purchases due to ATM-related issues. 
 
There is a large variety of existing and planned ROAs, each with its own unique in-flight 
capability. Some are very-high performance turbojets, some are piston-driven low-
performance aircraft, and some are akin to model aircraft in size and performance. 
 
None of these, however, currently possesses the functionality for unrestricted flight in the 
ATM system. They lack the requisite functionality by design; operate as military-unique 
vehicles employing special handling within civil or military airspace; or simply have not 
been designed with an eye toward flight in commercial airspace. 
 
Access 5 efforts now underway aim to allow ROAs unrestricted access to the NAS for 
normal flight operations. This implies new concepts, rules, and regulations for both 
ROAs and the ATM system.  
1.1 HSI Issues: Unrestricted ROA Flight in the ATM System 
 
There are very few HSI issues unique to ROA operation in the NAS. This is because, for 
the most part, ROAs are similar to inhabited aircraft and are expected to be able to 
comply with most existing regulations. 
 
However, the issues that do exist are significant and have, to date, disallowed unrestricted 
ROA flight in the NAS. 
 
The Primary Issues for the ROA pilot are: 
 
• Pilot ability to obtain required information on ROA performance and status in a 
timely fashion while operating on the ground and in flight 
• Pilot ability to affect control of the ROA as required and in a timely fashion while 
operating on the ground and in flight 
• Pilot ability to operate the ROA safely while operating on the ground and in flight 
• Pilot ability to operate the ROA in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations 
while operating on the ground and in flight 
 
The Primary Issues for the air traffic management (ATM) system are: 
 
• Air traffic controller ability to obtain required information on ROA performance 
and status in a timely fashion  
• Air traffic controller ability to control the ROA as part of the overall traffic flow 
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In addition, there are Secondary Issues that must be resolved to satisfy the issues above: 
• Satisfactory performance of ROA automation and autonomy including pilot 
override capability 
• Pilot-directed or autonomous design to accomplish hazard avoidance  
• Satisfactory performance of the pilot-ATM communications link 
• Satisfactory performance of the pilot-ROA  communications link 
• Development of procedures and plans for specific non-normal and emergencies 
operations  
 
The 2004 HSI effort is aimed at examining these and other issues to define HSI concepts 
and requirements for the pilot and air traffic controller that allow unrestricted ROA flight 
above FL400 in the NAS. 
2  Scope 
 
In this 2004 study, due to schedule and cost constraints, the HSI team was not able to 
analyze all domestic, foreign, civil, and military ROAs that might operate in the NAS. 
Therefore, to cover part of the spectrum of interest to Access 5, four ROAs were selected 
as representative samples of ROA designs. These are Altair, Perseus B, Helios, and 
Global Hawk. Each ROA has unique functionality and performance features. While each 
may not differ from inhabited aircraft in every dimension, each posses capabilities that 
set it apart from standard aircraft. 
 
In addition, as this analysis is conducted in Step 1 of the Program, focus is placed on HSI 
issues that exist for operations at and above FL400. These requirements will be refined 
throughout Step 1, and a final requirements document will be produced at the end of the 
Step, covering operations above FL 400. 
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3 Objectives 
 
This task is composed of several objectives. Objectives focus on the Primary and 
Secondary Issues involved in supporting unrestricted ROA flight in the NAS. As this is 
the first full year of the Program, these HSI results represent only the first stepping stones 
in the process of achieving solutions to the Primary and Secondary Issues described 
above. In succeeding years, HSI results will provide data illustrating clear cut options and 
answers to these Issues. 
 
As an initial step, it is necessary to identify the types of ROA that are flying currently. 
For each ROA, this provides an indication of operational capability, which leads to a 
definition of the role for its pilot.  
 
At the same time, it is necessary to identify Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) and 
recommended practices for the pilot (e.g., Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM)) for 
ROA flight in accord with Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).  
This is accomplished by surveying the appropriate FARs and AIM sections and then 
analyzing them for their applicability to ROA flight. These requirements represent new, 
probable flight operational goals for an ROA and indicate the functionality it must have 
to operate in the NAS. They also represent additional functions and task for the pilot in 
his or her need to comply with these ATC-related functions and tasks.  
 
Air Traffic Control also publishes regulations that affect flight in the NAS. The FAA 
Order 7110.65 defines ATC procedures and actions for the air traffic controller. These 
also need to be surveyed and analyzed for applicability to ROA flight in the NAS. 
 
A final review of regulatory documents in the context of ROA capability indicates the 
level of expected compliance by an ROA. Where an ROA has the capability to comply 
with an existing regulation or practice, it will be expected to do so. In some cases, it may 
not be possible to do so, in which case the FAA may define new regulations accordingly.  
 
Finally, once the analysis defines probable requirements in FARs, AIM, and Order 
7110.65, a complete definition of functions and task provides allows performance of an 
analysis of pilot and air traffic controller information requirements and control functions. 
These define the information that must be presented to the pilot and air traffic controller 
and the control actions they must be able to affect. 
 
These objectives represent the goals in the process for defining HSI guidelines and 
requirements for the pilot; air traffic controller; hardware, software, and procedures; and 
overall concepts of potential ROA operations in the NAS. This process and connectivity 
between objectives is illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Process for defining HSI guidelines and requirements for the pilot; air traffic 
controller; hardware, software, and procedures; and overall concepts of potential ROA 
operations in the NAS
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4 Assumptions and Ground Rules 
 
Assumptions and ground rules are partitioned into the following categories: 
 
• General Operation 
• Airspace  
• Hazard Avoidance 
• Weather Detection 
• Visual Acquisition and Identification of Ground and In-Flight Elements 
• Communications 
• Autonomy 
• Emergency Operations 
• Pilot skill, knowledge and ability requirements 
• ROA functionality 
 
Assumptions are based on the premise that a HALE ROA can have almost all the 
technological capability needed to satisfy rules and regulations. That is, the vehicle can 
meet most stated requirements and will not be granted exemptions, waivers, or changes to 
regulations (for its benefit) simply for convenience or profit. Technological issues that 
are unsolvable during the Access 5 Program timeframe will result in a CONOPS different 
from that now planned and different from a de facto inhabited aircraft. 
 
 
 
The list of concepts and requirements outlined in this analysis is not comprehensive. 
Instead, it is a description of potential issues, in the opinion of the authors, requiring 
changes in ROA functionality; modifications to the human interface between the ROA 
and its pilot; and upgrades to Order 7110.65 concepts and procedures. In addition, the 
standard flight practices, recommended procedures, and FAA regulations are only briefly 
described here where necessary for clarity or depth1. It is the charter of a CONOPS-
development organization to evaluate every flight operation detail.  
 
General Operation 
 
• The HALE ROA will never operate under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and will 
always operate under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). 
 
                                                
1 Most of this information can be found in the FARs, Aeronautical Information Manual, and FAA Order 
7110.65N. 
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• Each ROA complies with all applicable FARs and ATM procedures defined in 
Order 7110.65N except for the following: 
 
• The ROA manufacturer or user elects non-compliance and accepts the associated 
penalties (e.g., exclusion from airspace).  
 
• Compliance is not cost-effective and it is agreed by all applicable government and 
industry parties that the ROA is exempted from the applicable FAA regulation(s). 
 
• Compliance is not technically feasible and it is agreed by all applicable 
government and industry parties that the ROA is exempted from the applicable 
FAA regulation(s). 
 
Airspace  
 
• A HALE ROA operates as any de facto inhabited aircraft in any Class airspace and 
adheres to the FARs appropriate to each airspace. 
 
• The ROA traverses other classes of airspace in normal climb and descent, as well as 
in emergency descent. 
 
• For normal ‘file and fly’ operations, the ROA employs standard departure and arrival 
procedures (e.g., Departure Procedure, Standard Terminal Arrival Route). 
 
• Each ROA operates in congested areas in the same manner as a de facto inhabited 
aircraft. 
 
• There is no special handling to avoid compliance with normal operations. 
 
• There is no flight in Special Use Airspace (SUA) to avoid compliance with 
normal operations. 
 
 
 
Hazard Avoidance 
 
• Airborne traffic and weather hazards are avoided in their entirety without outside 
special assistance (e.g., chase vehicle). 
 
• Hazard avoidance maneuvers are consistent with ATC avoidance procedures. 
 
• Traffic - Airborne 
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• It is the sole responsibility of the ROA to avoid other aircraft at all times2. 
 
• Cooperative Collision Avoidance (CCA) System does not alter or diminish the 
pilot's basic authority and responsibility to ensure safe flight. Since CCA 
system  does not respond to an aircraft which is not transponder equipped or 
aircraft with a transponder failure, CCA system  alone does not ensure safe 
separation in every case3.  
 
• The position and nature of cooperative traffic is known with the functional 
equivalency of an inhabited aircraft (via, e.g., TCAS, ADS-B, imaging 
sensors). Cooperative traffic is able to determine the position and nature of the 
ROA and, hence, the required redundancy exists for two conflicting aircraft to 
sense-and-avoid each other using coordinated actions. 
 
• Appropriate detection technology is employed in concert with a ROA Ground 
Control Station (GCS) display. 
 
• The position and nature of non-cooperative traffic is known with the functional 
equivalency of an inhabited aircraft (via ROA’s sensor systems’ 
functionality). Identification technology is not in place on non-cooperative 
aircraft (e.g., transponder, ADS-B), primarily for financial reasons.  Non-
cooperative traffic is not able to determine the position and nature of the ROA 
and, hence, no redundancy exists for two conflicting aircraft to sense-and-
avoid each other using coordinated actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Weather Detection 
 
• Airborne 
• Weather hazards encountered in climb, cruise, descent, and approach are 
avoided to the same degree as in an inhabited aircraft4. Weather sensor data 
that is augmented by pilot direct viewing is superior to sensor data alone.  
 
                                                
2 FAA Advisory Circular 90-48C, Pilot’s Role in Collision Avoidance. "See and Avoid Concept. (1) The 
flight rules prescribed in Part 91 of the FARs set forth the concept of "See and Avoid." This concept 
requires that vigilance shall be maintained at all times, by each person operating an aircraft, regardless of 
whether the operation is conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual Flight Rules (VFR).  
b  Visual Scanning. (1) Pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of 
vision as well as periodically scanning the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure detection of 
conflicting traffic.” 
3 AIM, 4-4-15. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS I & II) (c). 
4 Hazards include icing (engine and airframe), thunderstorm, tornado, wind shear, microburst, turbulence, 
hail (including from thunderstorm anvils), severe precipitation, and volcanic ash. 
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• In-flight visibility (day and night) can be determined5. Hence, 
 
o The ROA can determine if it is in VMC or IMC. 
 
o The ROA can determine the flight visibility required for landing. 
 
o The ROA can operate according to VFR. 
 
• Distance from clouds (day and night) can be determined6. Hence, 
 
o The ROA can determine if it is in VMC or IMC. 
  
o The ROA can operate according to VFR. 
 
 
Visual Acquisition and Identification of  In-Flight Elements 
 
 
• In-Flight Elements 
 
• The ROA can locate, identify, and separate itself from airborne traffic (e.g., 
for purposes of following another aircraft). 
 
Communications 
 
• Telemetry and bandwidth as well as data and voice communication do not cause 
communications delays affecting any operation including an emergency or hazard 
avoidance maneuver. 
 
• The Operator communicates with ATC as a pilot of a de facto inhabited aircraft. 
 
 
 
Autonomy 
 
• The level of autonomy and automation provides for ROA compliance with all 
applicable FARs and ATM requirements (except as noted within this analysis). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 It is assumed that a sensor is available to perform this function. 
6 It is assumed that a sensor is available to perform this function. 
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Emergency Operations7 
 
• In an emergency, the ROA adheres to applicable FARs, e.g., Part 91 or equivalent. 
 
• The following events are emergencies: 
 
• Engine failure 
• Loss of communications between Operator and ATC 
• Loss of link between Operator and ROA 
• Major system’s failure (specifics dependent on vehicle design) 
• Significant failure of GCS elements 
• A ROA makes an emergency descent and landing by adhering to the appropriate 
FARs. 
 
• If a ROA has lost link with the Operator, it makes an emergency landing only if it can 
locate a suitable landing site. 
 
• A ROA makes an emergency landing at any suitable airport after the pilot has notified 
the airport control tower in the appropriate manner.  
 
• A ROA with AutoLand capability makes an emergency landing at any suitable airport 
without a control tower if it identifies local hazards, traffic pattern flow and direction, 
and the pilot notifies local aircraft of its intent (if practical), e.g., by transmitting on 
121.5 or 243.0 MHz, as appropriate. 
 
• A ROA without AutoLand capability makes an emergency landing at a suitable 
airport without a control tower only if a GCS is in place for its control; the pilot  at 
the GCS identifies local hazards, traffic pattern flow and direction; and the pilot 
notifies local aircraft of the ROA’s intent, e.g., by transmitting on 121.5 or 243.0 
MHz, as appropriate.  
 
 
 
 
• A ROA has an emergency when it acts unpredictably in response to an unexpected 
failure, generic software fault, or unforeseen event. 
 
• A ROA priority or emergency request is acceptable as long as it occurs only rarely. 
 
                                                
7 Except where noted, Emergency Operations are those that have been planned for (as part of vehicle design 
and certification) and include appropriate hardware, software, and (human and automation) procedural 
solutions. 
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• ROA disruption of normal ATC traffic flow for a valid reason is acceptable as long as 
it occurs only rarely. 
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5 Method 
5.1 For the Objective: Identify Significant ROA Functional Requirements Driven by 
the FARs and AIM. 
 
Information was collected from reference material and combined to form a basic set of 
flight operations requirements for a ROA. 
 
• FAA regulations were reviewed: 
• 1  Definitions and Abbreviations 
• 11  General Rulemaking Procedures 
• 23  Airworthiness Standards: Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter 
• 61 Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors 
• 65 Certification: Airmen Other Than Flight Crew Members 
• 91 General Operating and Flight Rules 
• 103 Ultralight Vehicles 
 
 
 
 
 
A review of FAR Parts 23 and 91 and AIM was the primary focus to gather basic flight 
operations information. For civil operations, FAA rules, regulations, and standard 
practices are the governing criteria. Of primary applicability is FAR Part 91, General 
Operating and Flight Rules that governs general aircraft operating rules in civil airspace8. 
This Part was reviewed in its entirety.  Based on previously gained knowledge of ROA 
operating capabilities, a preliminary analysis was performed to identify Part 91 paragraph 
content that may pose a challenge to ROA design and/or operations.  This yielded an 
identification of specific paragraphs that, in the opinion of the authors, may or may not 
need to be changed or modified to accommodate ROA operations. In addition, changes 
were identified to standard practices and procedures that are not listed explicitly in Part 
91. 
 
FAR Part 103, Ultralights, was examined due similarities between ultralights and small-
sized ROAs.  
 
The AIM was reviewed also. However, in general, its content largely mirrored that of the 
FARs and so little information directly attributable to the AIM was used. 
                                                
8 Pilots use FAR Part 91 as instructive and regulatory information that describes how aircraft must be 
operated in civil airspace. 
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5.2 For the Objective: Identify Significant ROA Functional Requirements Driven by 
the FAA Order 7110.65. 
 
FAA Order 7110.65 was evaluated in its entirety. A comparison was made of ROA 
functional capabilities and the requirements in 7110.65. This yielded an identification of 
specific 7110.65 paragraphs that, in the opinion of the authors, may or may not need to be 
changed or modified to accommodate ROA operations. In addition, changes were 
identified to standard practices and procedures that are not listed explicitly in 7110.65. 
 
These data were compared to the known capabilities of the four ROAs chosen for this 
study to identify areas in which the ROAs did or did not satisfy the requirements. In the 
opinion of the authors, some of these areas are easily attainable by any ROA while others 
are problematic. In this study, only the difficult or challenging areas were emphasized.  
5.3 For the Objective: Summary of Potential Concepts, Requirements, and 
Regulations. 
 
Findings from previous analyses of the FARs, AIM, and FAA Order 7110.65 were 
combined. The total of this information was analyzed in light of expected ROA 
capabilities to yield an indication of probable ROA compliance. This lead to a definition 
of requirements that an ROA is expected to comply with and those it would not.  Changes 
required to the documents were described. Rationales were given for each. 
 
The summary of these findings led to definition of a concept for ROA flight in the NAS, 
where most regulations and requirements for inhabited aircraft are adhered to by an ROA, 
but with some exceptions. The exceptions are described as irregularities to the current 
concept of flight for inhabited aircraft in the NAS. 
 
Safety was selected as the most critical topic. After reviewing the literature, ROA 
requirements were categorized according to safety-related criteria:  
 
• Communications 
• Emergencies 
• Automation and autonomy 
 
For each area, a requirement or concept was defined with an associated rationale for its 
applicability to a HALE ROA. 
 
5.4 For the Objective: Identify Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Functional and Task 
Requirements. 
 
Pilot functions were identified through a decomposition of potential concepts, 
requirements, and regulations. Functions were derived from these concepts, in concert 
with standard functions required of a pilot in an inhabited aircraft, to yield a set of ROA 
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pilot functions for flight above FL400.  Pilot task analysis and air traffic controller 
functions and task analyses were not performed; these will be conducted in FY05. 
5.5 For the Objective: Determine Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Information and 
Control Requirements. 
 
Pilot information requirements were identified through a decomposition of pilot 
functions. These requirements were derived from the functions analysis, in concert with 
standard information required of a pilot in an inhabited aircraft, to yield a set of ROA 
pilot information requirements for flight above FL400.  Pilot control requirements and air 
traffic controller information and control analyses were not performed; these will be 
conducted in FY05. 
5.6 Collaborative and Coordinating Efforts 
 
The Access 5 Human Systems Integration (HSI) team interacted with relevant Access 5 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), manufacturers, and operators to analyze ROA-ATM 
issues. In support of formal objectives, analytic, interview, and literature search methods 
were employed to gather all relevant data regarding the interface between these ROAs 
and their pilots, and ATM.  Manufacturer representatives and ROA pilots provided data 
describing their respective ROAs through interviews and questionnaires. The general HSI 
areas emphasized include: 
 
• Functions and Task Analysis – Analysis for identification of HSI functions required 
of the crew-ROA systems and ROA-ATC integration 
• Information and Control Capability Analysis – Analysis for identification of the 
information required of the ROA pilot and air traffic controller and required control 
functions for each. 
• Procedures Definition - Definition of standard HSI operational procedures for ROAs 
in the NAS 
• Coordination with Other IPTs - Delivery of information necessary Policy, ROA 
Impact, Technology, and Simulation IPTs 
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5.7 Significant ROA Functional Requirements Driven by the FARs and AIM. 
 
This objective is concerned with documenting existing FARs for inhabited aircraft and 
recommended practices in the AIM that appear applicable to ROA flight. These 
requirements must be defined in order to compare them to ROA functionality. While no 
requirements exist currently for ROA flight in domestic airspace, it may be assumed that 
existing FARs for inhabited aircraft and recommended practices in the AIM will largely 
mirror those for ROAs. Part 91 or a new Part equivalent to Part 91 may be developed for 
ROAs. 
 
This comparison must be undertaken for two reasons: (1) The Access 5 charter has 
indicated that ROAs shall operate as de facto inhabited aircraft, which implies the need 
for them to adhere to most existing FARs for inhabited aircraft and recommended 
practices in the AIM. In addition, (2) functions and tasks required of the pilot, and pilot 
interfaces to hardware, software, and procedures as well as interfaces with ATC must be 
based on the assumption that an ROA will adhere to most of these requirements and 
practices. This mandates an assessment of requirements and in-flight capabilities for 
ROAs and their pilots that will operate in the NAS on a regular basis. While it is 
reasonably clear at the outset that ROA functionality, and functions required of the pilot, 
must be similar to those of inhabited aircraft, the ROA’s uninhabited status and large 
variability in size and performance make its requirements definition unique.  
 
The scope of this task is limited to flight above FL400. 
5.7.1 Analysis of FARs 
 
Part 91 FARs applicable to ROA flight above FL400 were surveyed and are shown in 
Table 1, AIM paragraphs are shown in Table 2 . These FAR and AIM requirements and 
practices will be compared to ROA capabilities shown in Table 1. In the analysis 
described in section 5.9, identification is made of which of these requirements an ROA 
can and cannot satisfy. That analysis also notes additions and changes to the FARs and 
AIM that may be necessary for ROA operation in the NAS. Some sentences or 
paragraphs in these documents are not applicable to an ROA, or ROA pilot, because they 
make reference to a crew in an airborne flight deck. Due to time and budget limitations, 
the applicable and non-applicable parts of each FAR Section and AIM paragraph have 
not been analyzed in this way. 
 
. 
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Table 1. FARs Applicable to ROA Operation Above FL400 
Subpart A -- General 
 
Sec.  
91.1   Applicability.  
91.3   Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.  
91.5   Pilot in command of aircraft requiring more than one required pilot.  
91.7   Civil aircraft airworthiness.  
91.9   Civil aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements.  
91.11   Prohibition on interference with crewmembers.  
91.13   Careless or reckless operation.  
91.15   Dropping objects.  
91.17   Alcohol or drugs.  
91.19   Carriage of narcotic drugs, marihuana, and depressant or stimulant drugs or substances.  
91.25   Aviation Safety Reporting Program: Prohibition against use of reports for enforcement purposes.  
 
Subpart B -- Flight Rules 
 
GENERAL 
 
91.101   Applicability.  
91.103   Preflight action.  
91.105   Flight crewmembers at stations.  
91.109   Flight instruction; Simulated instrument flight and certain flight tests. 9 
91.111   Operating near other aircraft.  
91.113   Right-of-way rules: Except water operations.  
91.119   Minimum safe altitudes: General.  
91.121   Altimeter settings.  
91.123   Compliance with ATC clearances and instructions.  
91.135   Operations in Class A airspace. 
91.139   Emergency air traffic rules.  
91.143   Flight limitation in the proximity of space flight operations.  
  
INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES 
 
91.167   Fuel requirements for flight in IFR conditions.  
91.169   IFR flight plan: Information required.  
91.171   VOR equipment check for IFR operations.  
91.173   ATC clearance and flight plan required.  
91.179   IFR cruising altitude or flight level.  
91.180   Operations within airspace designated as Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum airspace. 
91.181   Course to be flown.  
91.183   IFR radio communications.  
91.185   IFR operations: Two-way radio communications failure.  
91.187   Operation under IFR in controlled airspace: Malfunction reports.  
 
 
 
Subpart C -- Equipment, Instrument, and Certificate Requirements 
                                                
9 It is not clear at this time is this Section is applicable. 
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91.201   [Reserved]  
91.203   Civil aircraft: Certifications required.  
91.205   Powered civil aircraft with standard category U.S. airworthiness certificates: Instrument and 
equipment requirements.  
91.207   Emergency locator transmitters.  
91.209   Aircraft lights.  
91.213   Inoperative instruments and equipment.  
91.215   ATC transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use.  
91.217   Data correspondence between automatically reported pressure altitude data and the pilot's altitude 
reference.  
91.219   Altitude alerting system or device: Turbojet-powered civil airplanes.10 
91.221   Traffic alert and collision avoidance system equipment and use.11  
91.224-91.299   [Reserved] 
 
                                                
10 It is not clear at this time is this Section is applicable. 
11 It is not clear at this time is this Section is applicable. 
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Table 2. AIM Paragraphs Applicable to ROA Operation Above FL400 
 
Chapter 4. Air Traffic Control 
Section 2. Radio Communications Phraseology and Techniques 
 4-2-1. General   4-2-8. Figures 
 4-2-2. Radio Technique   4-2-9. Altitudes and Flight Levels 
 4-2-3. Contact Procedures  4-2-10. Directions 
 4-2-4. Aircraft Call Signs  4-2-11. Speeds 
 4-2-5. Description of Interchange or Leased Aircraft  4-2-12. Time 
 4-2-6. Ground Station Call Signs     
 4-2-7. Phonetic Alphabet     
 
Section 4. ATC Clearances/Separations 
 4-4-1. Clearance  4-4-9. Adherence to Clearance  
 4-4-2. Clearance Prefix   4-4-10. IFR Separation Standards  
 4-4-3. Clearance Items  4-4-11. Speed Adjustments 
 4-4-4. Amended Clearances  4-4-15. 
Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System  
(TCAS I & II)  
 4-4-6. Pilot Responsibility upon Clearance Issuance  4-4-16. 
Traffic Information Service 
(TIS) 
 
Chapter 5. Air Traffic Procedures 
Section 1. Preflight  
 5-1-1. Preflight Preparation  5-1-10.  Change in Flight Plan 
 5-1-2. Follow IFR Procedures Even When Operating VFR  5-1-11.  
Change in Proposed 
Departure Time 
 5-1-3. Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) System   5-1-13.  Canceling IFR Flight Plan 
 5-1-7. Flight Plan- IFR Flights   5-1-14. RNAV and RNP Operations 
  
Section 3. En Route Procedures 
 5-3-1.  ARTCC Communications   5-3-5. Airway or Route Course Changes  
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 5-3-2. Position Reporting   5-3-6. Changeover Points (COP'S) 
 5-3-3. Additional Reports  5-3-7. Holding  
 5-3-4. Airways and Route Systems    
 
Section 5. Pilot/Controller Roles and Responsibilities  
 5-5-1. General   5-5-9. Speed Adjustments  
 5-5-2. Air Traffic Clearance  5-5-10. Traffic Advisories (Traffic Information)  
 5-5-6. Radar Vectors  5-5-15. Minimum Fuel Advisory 
 5-5-7.  Safety Alert   5-5-16. RNAV and RNP Operations 
 5-5-8.  See and Avoid    
 
Section 6. National Security and Interception Procedures 
 5-6-1. National Security  5-6-4. Interception Signals  
 5-6-2. Interception Procedures   5-6-5. 
ADIZ Boundaries and 
Designated Mountainous 
Areas  
 5-6-3. 
Law Enforcement 
Operations by Civil and 
Military Organizations  
   
 
 
Chapter 6. Emergency Procedures 
Section 1. General  
 6-1-1. Pilot Responsibility and Authority  
 6-1-2. Emergency Condition- Request Assistance Immediately 
 
Section 2. Emergency Services Available to Pilots  
 6-2-2.  Transponder Emergency Operation   6-2-5. 
Emergency Locator 
Transmitter (ELT)  
 6-2-3. 
Direction Finding 
Instrument Approach 
Procedure  
 6-2-7. Search and Rescue 
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 6-2-4. Intercept and Escort     
 
Section 3. Distress and Urgency Procedures 
 6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications   6-3-4. 
Special Emergency  
(Air Piracy)  
 6-3-2. Obtaining Emergency Assistance   6-3-5.  Fuel Dumping 
 
Section 4. Two-way Radio Communications Failure 
 6-4-1. Two-way Radio Communications Failure 
 6-4-2.  Transponder Operation During Two-way Communications Failure  
 6-4-3. Reestablishing Radio Contact     
 
Chapter 7. Safety of Flight  
Section 1. Meteorology 
 7-1-3. Use of Aviation Weather Products  7-1-17. Reporting of Cloud Heights 
 7-1-4. Preflight Briefing  7-1-19.  Estimating Intensity of Rain and Ice Pellets  
 7-1-5. En Route Flight Advisory Service (EFAS)   7-1-21.  
Pilot Weather Reports 
(PIREP's)  
 7-1-6. Inflight Aviation Weather Advisories   7-1-22. 
PIREP's Relating to 
Airframe Icing  
 7-1-7. Categorical Outlooks   7-1-23. PIREP's Relating to Turbulence 
 7-1-8. Telephone Information Briefing Service (TIBS)   7-1-15. 
ATC Inflight Weather 
Avoidance Assistance 
 7-1-9. Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWEB)   7-1-24.  Wind Shear PIREP's 
 7-1-10. Inflight Weather Broadcasts   7-1-25. 
Clear Air Turbulence 
(CAT) PIREP's 
 7-1-11. Flight Information Services Data Link (FISDL)   7-1-27. 
PIREP's Relating to 
Volcanic Ash Activity 
 7-1-12. Weather Observing Programs   7-1-28. Thunderstorms  
 7-1-13. Weather Radar Services   7-1-29. Thunderstorm Flying  
 7-1-14. National Convective Weather Forecast (NCWF)    
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5.8 Significant ROA Functional Requirements Driven by the FAA Order 7110.65. 
 
This objective is concerned with documenting existing sections of FAA Order 7110.65 
for inhabited aircraft and then determine which appear applicable to ROAs. In addition to 
requirements in the FARs and AIM, requirements exist in FAA Order 7110.65. These 
requirements dictate operational rules for the ATC system and air traffic controller 
functions and tasks. Inhabited aircraft comply with these rules as they are issued via an 
ATC clearance. ROAs are expected to adhere to these rules as well.  
 
This objective also is concerned with identifying those paragraphs of 7110.65 that may 
require modification due to ROA functionality. ROA functionality may not be completely 
compatible with all paragraphs in FAA Order 7110.65. This may be due to their unique 
designs and performance capabilities. There are precedents for this, not only for unusual 
aircraft but also for aircraft that require extra latitude in flight operations.  
 
As described in the previous section, this comparison must be undertaken for two 
reasons: (1) The Access 5 charter has indicated that ROAs shall operate as de facto 
inhabited aircraft, which implies the need for them to adhere to most existing FAA Order 
7110.65 en route sections for inhabited aircraft. In addition, (2) functions and tasks 
required of the pilot and air traffic controller, and pilot and air traffic controller interfaces 
to hardware, software, and procedures must be based on the assumption that an ROA will 
adhere to most of ATC’s standards. This mandates an assessment of requirements and in-
flight capabilities for ROAs, their pilots, and air traffic controllers. While it is reasonably 
clear at the outset that ROA functionality, functions required of the pilot, and functions 
required of the air traffic controller must be similar to those of inhabited aircraft, the 
ROA’s uninhabited status and large variability in size and performance make its 
requirements definition unique.  
 
These FAA Order 7110.65 requirements will be compared to ROA capabilities shown in 
Table 1 in the analysis described in 5.9. In that analysis, identification is made of which 
FAA Order 7110.65 requirements an ROA can and cannot satisfy. That analysis also 
notes additions and changes to FAA Order 7110.65 that may be necessary for ROA 
operation in the NAS. 
 
The scope of this task is limited to flight above FL400. 
5.8.1 Analysis of FAA Order 7110.65 
 
FAA Order 7110.65 paragraphs applicable to ROA flight above FL400 were surveyed 
and shown in Table 3.  Some sentences or paragraphs in these documents are not 
applicable to an ROA, or ROA pilot, because they make reference to a crew in an 
airborne flight deck or flight with passengers onboard. Due to time and budget 
limitations, the applicable and non-applicable parts of each paragraph have not been 
analyzed in this way. 
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Table 3. FAA Order 7110.65 Paragraphs Applicable to ROA Operation Above FL400 
 
 
Chapter 2. General Control 
Section 1. General 
 2-1-1. ATC Service  2-1-13. Formation Flights 
 2-1-2. Duty Priority  2-1-14. Coordinate Use of Airspace 
 2-1-4. Operational Priority  2-1-17. Radio Communications Transfer 
 2-1-5. Expeditious Compliance  2-1-18. Operational Requests 
 2-1-6. Safety Alert  2-1-22. Bird Activity Information 
 2-1-7. Inflight Equipment Malfunctions  2-1-26. 
Pilot Deviation 
Notification 
 2-1-8. Minimum Fuel  2-1-27. TCAS Resolution Advisories 
 2-1-10. NAVAID Malfunctions    
 
Section 4. Radio and Interphone Communications 
 2-4-1. Radio Communications  2-4-12. Interphone Message Format 
 2-4-2. Monitoring  2-4-13. Interphone Message Termination 
 2-4-3. Pilot Acknowledgement/ Read Back  2-4-14. Words and Phrases 
 2-4-4. Authorized Interruptions  2-4-19. Facility Identification 
 2-4-16. ICAO Phonetics  2-4-20. Aircraft Identification 
 2-4-17. Numbers Usage  2-4-21. Description of Aircraft Types 
 2-4-18. Number Clarification    
 
Section 5. Route and NAVAID Description 
 2-5-1. Airways and Routes  2-5-3. NAVAID Fixes 
 2-5-2. NAVAID Terms 
 
Section 6. Weather Information 
  
xxiii 
  
 2-6-1. Familiarization  2-6-3. PIREP Information 
 2-6-2. Hazardous Inflight Weather Advisory Service (HIWAS)    
 
 
Section 7. Altimeter Settings 
 2-7-1. Current Settings    
 2-7-2. Altimeter Setting Issuance Below Lowest Usable FL 
 
Chapter 4. IFR  
Section 1. NAVAID Use Limitations  
 4-1-3. Crossing Altitude  4-1-5. Fix Use 
 
Section 2. Clearances  
 4-2-1. Clearance Items  4-2-5. Route or Altitude Amendments 
 4-2-2. Clearance Prefix  4-2-6. Through Clearances  
 4-2-3. Delivery Instructions  4-2-9. Clearance Items 
  
Section 4. Route Assignment  
 4-4-1. Route Use  4-4-4. Alternative Routes 
 4-4-2. Route Structure Transitions    
   
Section 5. Altitude Assignment and Verification  
 4-5-1. Vertical Separation Minima  4-5-6. Minimum En Route Altitudes 
 4-5-2. Flight Direction  4-5-7. Altitude Information 
 4-5-3. Exceptions  4-5-8. Anticipated Altitude Changes 
    4-5-9. Altitude Confirmation- Nonradar 
  
Section 6. Holding Aircraft  
 4-6-1. Clearance to Holding Fix  4-6-4. Holding Instructions  
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 4-6-2. Clearance Beyond Fix   4-6-6. Holding Flight Path Deviation 
 4-6-3. Delays  4-6-7.  Unmonitored NAVAIDs 
 
Chapter 5. Radar  
Section 1. General  
 5-1-8. Merging Target Procedures  5-1-12. Position Reporting 
 5-1-9. Holding Pattern Surveillance  5-1-13. Radar Service Termination 
 5-1-10. Deviation Advisories    
    
Section 2. Beacon Systems  
 5-2-1. Assignment Criteria  5-2-13.  Code Monitor 
 5-2-2. Discrete Environment  5-2-14.  
Failure to Display Assigned 
Beacon Code or 
Inoperative/ Malfunctioning 
Transponder  
 5-2-3. Nondiscrete Environment  5-2-15. Inoperative or Malfunctioning Interrogator 
 5-2-4.  Mixed Environment  5-2-16. Failed Transponder in Class A Airspace 
 5-2-5.  Radar Beacon Code Changes  5-2-17. 
Validation of Mode C 
Readout 
 5-2-6. Function Code Assignments  5-2-18. 
Altitude Confirmation- 
Mode C 
 5-2-7. Emergency Code Assignment  5-2-19.  
Altitude Confirmation- 
Non-Mode C 
 5-2-8.  Radio Failure  5-2-20.  Automatic Altitude Reporting 
    5-2-22. Beacon Termination 
      
  
Section 3. Radar Identification  
 5-3-1. Application  5-3-4. 
Terminal Automation 
Systems Identification 
Methods 
 5-3-2.  Primary Radar  5-3-5. Questionable Identification 
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Identification Methods  
 5-3-3.  Beacon Identification Methods  5-3-6.  Position Information 
    5-3-7. Identification Status 
  
 
Section 4. Transfer of Radar Identification 
 5-4-1. Application  5-4-6. Receiving Controller Handoff 
 5-4-2. Terms   5-4-7. Point Out 
 5-4-3. Methods  5-4-8. Automated Information Transfer (AIT) 
 5-4-4. Traffic   5-4-9. Interfacility Automated Information Transfer 
 5-4-5. Transferring Controller Handoff  5-4-10. Prearranged Coordination 
  
Section 5. Radar Separation  
 5-5-1. Application  5-5-7. Passing or Diverging 
 5-5-2. Target Separation  5-5-8. Additional Separation for Formation Flights  
 5-5-3. Target Resolution  5-5-10. Adjacent Airspace 
 5-5-4. Minima   5-5-11. Edge of Scope 
 5-5-5. Vertical Application  5-5-12. Beacon Target Displacement 
 5-5-6. Exceptions  5-5-13. GPA 102/103 Correction Factor 
  
Section 6. Vectoring  
 5-6-1.  Application    
 5-6-2.  Methods    
  
Section 7. Speed Adjustment  
 5-7-1.  Application  5-7-4. Termination 
 5-7-2. Methods    
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Section 14. Automation- En Route  
 5-14-1. 
Conflict Alert (CA) and 
Mode C Intruder (MCI) 
Alert  
 5-14-5.  Selected Altitude Limits 
 5-14-3.  Computer Entry of Assigned Altitude  5-14-6. Sector Eligibility  
 5-14-4. Entry of Reported Altitude  5-14-7. Coast Tracks 
    5-14-8. Controller Initiated Coast Tracks 
 
Chapter 10. Emergencies 
Section 1. General 
 10-1-1. Emergency Determinations  10-1-4. Responsibility 
 10-1-2. Obtaining Information  10-1-5. Coordination 
 10-1-3. Providing Assistance    
    
Section 2. Emergency Assistance  
 10-2-1. Information Requirements  10-2-9. 
Radar Assistance 
Techniques 
 10-2-2. Frequency Changes  10-2-10. Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Signals 
 10-2-3. Aircraft Orientation  10-2-13. Emergency Airport Recommendation 
 10-2-4. Altitude Change for Improved Reception  10-2-14.  
Guidance to Emergency 
Airport 
 10-2-5. Emergency Situations  10-2-16. Volcanic Ash  
 10-2-6. Hijacked Aircraft     
      
Section 4. Control Actions  
 10-4-4. Communications Failure    
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5.9 Summary of Potential Concepts, Requirements, and Regulations. 
 
This objective is concerned with summarizing the results from the analyses of FARs, 
AIM, and FAA Order 7110.65. The summary indicates those regulations and practices 
that an ROA is expected to comply with. These lead to the definition of requirements for 
pilot and air traffic controller functions, tasks, and information and control requirements. 
In addition, this task outlines regulations and practices that may be need to be changed, 
based on HSI analysis, because of ROA functionality shortfalls and interfaces for the 
pilot and air traffic controller. 
 
The scope of this task is limited to flight above FL400. 
5.9.1 ROA Ability to Satisfy Requirements for Flight in the NAS 
 
An analysis of FAR Part 91, applicable sections of the AIM, and relevant paragraphs 
from FAA Order 7110.65 was made to identify a complete set of requirements for IFR 
flight above FL400. This includes functions for the ROA, pilot, and air traffic controller.    
Table 4 lists only those capabilities that are required for IFR flight above FL400 against 
the capability of the four selected ROAs to provide the necessary functionality. 
 
Inspection of the table shows that, for the four ROAs under review, most NAS 
requirements have been satisfied. The primary exception is hazard avoidance, which 
takes the form of the ROA’s inability to detect and avoid traffic and weather. It can be 
seen also that hazard avoidance capability is subject to ROA design. Nevertheless, it is 
generally understood that traffic and weather detection and avoidance are issues for most 
ROAs. Incorporation of the requisite hardware and software, to provide traffic and 
weather information to the pilot and/or automation, will satisfy these requirements. 
 
   Table 4. Functionalities Required for IFR Flight Above FL400 Compared to 
Capabilities of the Four Selected  ROAs 
Functionality Description Functionality Capability  
 
ID 
Vehicle Altair Perseus 
B 
Helios Global 
Hawk 
 
FLIGHT12 
 
1 Pitch, Roll, Yaw 13 YES YES YES YES 
4 Indicated/Calibrated/Equivalent Airspeed YES YES YES YES 
5 Mach Number14 N/A N/A N/A YES 
6 Altitude YES YES YES YES 
7 Barometric Altimeter Setting YES YES YES YES 
                                                
12 Control or display capability. 
13 Requirement dictated by aircraft design. 
14 Only as required by airspeed/Mach envelope. 
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9 Vertical Speed YES YES YES YES 
12 Pilot-ATC Communication YES YES YES YES 
13 Pilot-ROA Communication YES YES YES YES 
14 DELETED     
 
NAVIGATION15 
 
16 Heading YES YES YES YES 
18 Track (Magnetic/True) YES YES NO YES 
21 Vertical Profile Deviation YES YES YES YES 
23 Lateral Profile Deviation YES YES YES YES 
30 Interactive Flight Plan Revising YES YES YES YES 
32 RNAV Capability (via GPS, INS, or equivalent) YES YES YES YES 
33 Radio (VHF/UHF)16 YES YES YES YES 
34 DME  (Distance measuring)  YES YES YES YES 
41 Distance to Go YES YES YES YES 
42 Time to Go YES YES YES YES 
43 Wind Speed and Direction YES YES YES YES 
44 Estimated Time of Arrival at Waypoint YES YES YES YES 
45 DELETED     
46 Aircraft Position YES YES YES YES 
 
SURVEILLANCE 
 
59 Permit ATC Secondary Surveillance Radar 
Identification via Transponder or Datalink 
YES YES YES YES 
 
HAZARD AVOIDANCE – SURVEILLANCE17 
 
60 Weather (Direct View)  YES YES NO NO 
61 Weather (Radar) YES YES NO NO 
62 Precipitation (Direct View)  YES YES NO NO 
63 Precipitation (Electronic)  YES YES NO NO 
64 Turbulence (Direct View)  YES YES NO YES 
65 Turbulence (Electronic)  YES YES NO NO 
66 Lightning (Direct View)  YES YES YES NO 
67 Lightning (Electronic)  YES NO NO NO 
68 Volcanic Ash (Direct View)  YES YES NO NO 
74 Flight Traffic (Direct View)  YES YES NO NO 
75 Flight Traffic (Electronic)  YES NO NO NO 
 
MISCELLANEOUS 
 
84 Identify Visual Flight Rules Conditions YES YES NO NO 
                                                
15 Control or display capability. 
16 Navigation capability may be satisfied by use of self-contained navigation capability or via NAVAIDS.  
17 Hazards may be identified by direct view or electronic display.  
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5.9.2 ROA Lack of Capability for Hazard Avoidance 
 
The main HSI issue for ROA operation in the NAS is providing the pilot-ROA system 
information for see-and-avoid, or hazard avoidance functionality. In this sense, ‘hazard’ 
is defined as anything that is hazardous to the vehicle and must be avoided. It is 
characterized by (1) traffic and (2) weather, both of which exist on the ground and in 
flight (see ID 60-75 in the table above). 
 
The analysis of see-and-avoid for traffic has been conducted in 2004 by MTSI and is 
documented in Annex B to this report. 
 
The main issue of hazard avoidance centers on the ROA’s inability to provide the 
functional equivalency of inhabited aircraft. ROAs typically do not have imaging systems 
that provide, in total, an equivalent functionality of the human pilot. Their imaging 
systems are deficient in one or more technical areas such as resolution, field-of-view, 
field-of-regard, color resolution, etc. Some ROAs employ excellent sensors that are used 
as payloads. But they are not designated as full-time, hazard avoidance devices solely for 
the purpose of satisfying requirements to fly in the NAS. Detailed requirements for the 
functionality and information required by the pilot are shown in Error! Reference 
source not found. and Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
An option that may provide functional equivalency is the use of electronic data in 
combination with, or in lieu of, imaging. Data displays may provide the required 
functional equivalency of the human pilot by displaying data that describe the position 
and hazardous level of traffic and weather. Work is underway to determine the utility of 
these technologies by the Cooperative Collision Avoidance group of the Technology IPT. 
 
As of 2004, for flight above FL400, ROA shortfalls exist in the detection and avoidance 
of traffic and weather at a level of competency that is required for flight in the NAS. 
5.9.3 Potential Changes to FARs and/or FAA Order 7110.65 
 
A FAR or ATM Change Requirement and Rationale are used to describe the FAR or 
FAA Order 7110.65 paragraph or other requirement that is unlikely to be satisfied by a 
HALE ROA. This is based on an HSI analysis of planned ROA operations and the roles 
of the pilot and air traffic controller. The FAR or ATM Change Requirement describes 
the requirement and compares it to ROA capability. Rationale describes the basis for 
changing the requirement and the impact on the ROA-ATM system. 
 
In some instances, FAR or ATM Change Requirement may not be the best description of 
the relationship between the HALE ROA and the NAS. The Access 5 
government/industry partnership may decide that a ROA should not comply with an FAR 
or 7110.65 requirement even though it has the technical capability to do so. While the 
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ROA may be able to comply, it may not be operationally prudent for it to do so due to 
lack of operational necessity and safety concerns.   
 
The results were partitioned into two categories: 
 
1. Communications  
 
This constitutes an operation where the ROA pilot is required to make a pilot report 
(PIREP) of significant weather or safety of flight issues. In general, it does not appear 
likely that this can be accomplished without an onboard pilot. However, ROA sensors 
may provide some data to report. ATC should not always expect a PIREP in accord 
with 7110.65, paragraph 2-6-3. 
 
2. Emergencies  
 
This constitutes operations where the ROA experiences expected and unexpected 
emergencies.  Expected emergencies should be handled well and in accord with 
applicable procedures and regulations. Unplanned emergencies are expected due to 
unexpected failures, generic software faults, or unforeseen events that are beyond the 
capability of automation control. Here, the ROA will act unpredictably with unknown 
consequences yet it must act in accord with FARs covering emergency operations. 
The primary areas include: Communications Failure and Automation. 
5.9.3.1 Changes and Their Expected Impact on Operations 
 
FAR Part 91 and FAA Order 7110.65 paragraphs that may need to be changed for 
unrestricted HALE ROA flight above FL400 and their associated operational impact on 
ROA and ATM operations are shown in Table 5. The Impact on Operations estimates the 
potential level of disruption to the ROA and ATM system (assuming a standard operating 
day without unusual mission, traffic, or weather events). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. FAR, AIM, and 7110.65N Paragraphs (and Associated Impacts) that May 
Require Change for Unrestricted HALE ROA Flight Operations (Year 2008) 
Impact on Operations Paragraph Number ATM Change Requirement 
ROA ATM 
FAR 91.155/91.175 Flight Visibility and Distance to Clouds Low* Low* 
AIM, 7-1-21 Communication (PIREP) Low High* 
FAR 91.185/new 
7110.65, 3-2-1 
Communications Failure High High 
7110.65 new ROA Autonomy   High High 
*TBV 
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5.9.3.1.1 Flight Visibility and Distance to Clouds 
5.9.3.1.1.1 ATM Change Requirement 
 
Under FAR 91.155 and 91.175, ATC should not expect a ROA to determine 
 
• its flight visibility or clearance from clouds  
• the flight visibility required for landing18  
• if it is in VMC or IMC.  
5.9.3.1.1.1.1 Rationale 
 
• It is expected that in-flight visibility and distance to clouds (day and night) cannot be 
determined due to technical shortfalls in sensor technology. The human pilot has 
limited ability to determine flight visibility but not accurately (i.e., not to fractions of 
a mile or within hundreds of feet) in a low visibility IFR approach. 
 
• In-flight visibility determination is not a significant issue. As long as the reported 
ground visibility for the approach is at or above approach minimums for the ROA, the 
ROA may make the approach and land if it has the runway environment19 in sight at 
the Decision Height or Missed Approach Point (as appropriate). As long as the ROA 
sensor system can detect one or more of the runway environment elements, it 
complies with 91.175 and may land. If it cannot, it may not land and will either need 
to make the approach again or proceed to an alternate.  
 
• The role of required visibility for landing is TBD for those ROAs that are certified to 
land without direct pilot involvement. 
 
• In-flight determination of the distance to clouds is applicable only in the 
determination of VMC and IMC conditions, and in particular, when an aircraft is 
complying with VFR cloud clearance rules. If a ROA will not operate under VFR, 
this issue is academic.  
5.9.3.1.2 Communications20 
5.9.3.1.2.1 In Flight Reports (PIREPs) 
                                                
18 FAR 91.175 (d): Landing. No pilot operating an aircraft, except a military aircraft of the United States, 
may land that aircraft when the flight visibility is less than the visibility prescribed in the standard 
instrument approach procedure being used.  
19 FAR 91.175 (c): Operation below DH or MDA. … (i) The approach light system, except that the pilot 
may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a 
reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable. 
(ii) The threshold. (iii) The threshold markings. (iv) The threshold lights.  (v) The runway end identifier 
lights. (vi) The visual approach slope indicator.  (vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings.  
(viii) The touchdown zone lights. (ix) The runway or runway markings. (x) The runway lights.   
20 Communications failures are listed in section 5.9.3.1.3, Emergencies 
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5.9.3.1.2.1.1 ATM Change Requirement   
 
ATC should not expect a ROA to volunteer a PIREP nor be able to provide substantial 
information about its environment when questioned. 
5.9.3.1.2.1.2 Rationale 
 
It is standard practice for a pilot to make PIREP of a significant or unusual condition that 
affects flight safety and/or operations. FAA air traffic facilities are required to solicit 
PIREPs. Pilots are urged to cooperate and promptly volunteer reports of these conditions 
and other atmospheric data such as cloud bases, tops and layers; flight visibility; 
precipitation; visibility restrictions such as haze, smoke and dust; wind at altitude; and 
temperature aloft. They can be extremely important in providing last minute, detailed 
information on significant weather, such as clear air turbulence, airframe icing, and wind 
shear. Without a human in the ROA, it seems unlikely that the capability exists to make a 
comprehensive PIREP. However, the Operator may obtain certain information from the 
ROA sensors and report to ATC (TBV). 
5.9.3.1.3 Emergencies  
5.9.3.1.3.1 Communications Failure   
5.9.3.1.3.1.1 Operator – ATC Loss of Communications 
5.9.3.1.3.1.1.1 ATM Change Requirement    
 
Under FAR 91.185, ATC should expect the ROA to proceed to the nearest suitable 
airport and land as soon as practicable, regardless of whether the ROA is in VFR or IFR 
conditions.  
5.9.3.1.3.1.1.2 Rationale 
 
This type of communications failure is analogous to a loss of communications between 
the pilot of a normal aircraft and ATC.  In such a case, the philosophy behind the 
applicable FARs is that the aircraft should remain aloft for the minimum amount of time 
while not under ATC control. Landing takes the aircraft out of controlled airspace, where 
it causes disruption to ATC traffic flow, sequencing, separation, controller workload, and 
safety, and places it on the ground. 
 
FAR 91.185 and AIM 6-4-1 specify the procedure for the pilot. A distinction is made 
regarding whether the aircraft is in IMC or VMC. If in IMC, the aircraft must remain on 
its IFR flight plan. However, if it encounters VMC and determines that it is in VFR 
conditions, it must abandon its IFR flight plan and land as soon as practicable21. 
 
                                                
21 VFR conditions are specified in FAR 91.155   
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In the case of a ROA, as it has been assumed in this analysis that it cannot determine if it 
is in VFR conditions, it should land as soon as practicable regardless of weather 
conditions. In addition, the capability exist in ROAs with self-contained navigation 
capability, i.e., INS and/or GPS, to navigate from its present position to a nearest suitable 
airport regardless of weather conditions. 
5.9.3.1.3.1.2 Operator – ROA Loss of Link 
5.9.3.1.3.1.2.1 ATM Change Requirement    
 
Under new, proposed FAR and 7110.65 sections, ATC should expect the ROA to proceed 
to the nearest suitable airport and land as soon as practicable.  
5.9.3.1.3.1.2.2 Rationale 
 
This type of communications failure is not analogous to any type loss of communications 
for inhabited aircraft. It represents a case where the Operator has lost direct control of the 
vehicle and the aircraft operates solely according to programming with no real-time 
human involvement. The ROA may or may not operate safely in such a circumstance 
with the probability of failure increasing over time.  
 
In such a case, the philosophy behind the proposed regulation(s) FARs is that the aircraft 
should remain aloft for the minimum amount of time while not under ATC control and 
land at the nearest suitable airport as soon as practicable.   
 
Annex B to this report, prepared by MTSI, provides HSI requirements and guidelines for 
ROA pilot-ATC (C2) , command and control. 
5.9.3.1.3.2 Automation 
5.9.3.1.3.2.1.1 ATM Change Requirement   
 
Under a new, proposed 7110.65 section for normal ROA operations, ATC should be 
made aware that ROA automation exhibits the following characteristics: 
 
• ROA automation/autonomy exhibit functionality for normal and emergency 
operations to comply with applicable FARs (as would a de facto inhabited aircraft).  
• The Pilot has real-time data on ROA systems’ status and performance (as would the 
pilot of an inhabited aircraft). 
• The Pilot may or may not have the capability for immediate automation/control 
override during any phase of flight or whenever the ROA may pose an immediate 
hazard to persons or property (unlike the pilot of an inhabited aircraft). 
• The Pilot communicates with ATC to carry out all ATC clearances (as would the pilot 
of an inhabited aircraft). 
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Under a new, proposed 7110.65 section for abnormal and emergency ROA operations, 
ATC should be made aware that ROA automation may exhibit the following 
characteristics: 
 
• Unexpected failures, generic software faults, or unforeseen events that are beyond the 
capability of automation control, may cause the ROA to act unpredictably with 
unknown consequences. 
• During a loss of link between the Pilot and ROA, the Pilot has no direct control of 
the vehicle and ROA operates solely according to programming with no real-time 
human involvement 
5.9.3.1.3.2.1.2 Rationale 
 
These sections should be added to 7110.65 to educate and alert the controller to ROA 
capabilities and actions. (As ROA-ATC operations mature, specific details may be added 
to 7110.65.) Controllers are aware of the performance and capabilities of the aircraft 
under their control. However, those aircraft that are extreme in their performance (e.g., 
very fast, very slow) can precipitate extra workload in controlling such aircraft with the 
mainstream flow of other traffic. 
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